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Abstract
Cognitive science of religion (CSR) suggests the naturalness of religion. Religious beliefs are 
viewed as natural because they are intuitive and cognitively effortless. They are also inevitable 
and more obvious than atheism. In consequence, atheism is an unnatural phenomenon which re-
quires special cultural and social support. However, this naturalness of religion hypothesis seems 
overestimated. Here we show that atheism is more natural than religion and religious beliefs in the 
cognitive sense because it meets the criteria appropriate for natural selection in the sense of ultimate 
explanation. Religion and religious beliefs require cultural inputs. Without cultural support, they 
seem unnatural.
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Religion cannot be cognitively natural because it is biologically 
unnatural
The “cognitive theory of religion” was introduced by Stewart Guthrie in 1980.1 Cog-
nitive science of religion (CSR) assumes the immutability and homogeneity of cogni-
tive mechanisms which are independent of cultural diversity.2 CSR explains (but does 
1 A. Visala, Ashgate Science and Religion: Naturalism, Theism and the Cognitive Study of Religion: 
Religion Explained? Surrey 2011, p. 10; S. Guthrie, A Cognitive Theory of Religion, “Current Anthropol-
ogy” 1980, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 2–3.
2 D. Leech, A. Visala, Naturalistic Explanation for Religious Belief [and Comments and Reply], 
“Philosophy Compass” 2011, no. 6 (8), p. 554.
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not interpret) religious beliefs, ideas, and behaviours, and looks for their cognitive 
roots.3 CSR naturalises religion and religious beliefs.4 Religious beliefs are inter-
preted as a natural phenomenon which is a result of cognitive biases.5 Atheism does 
not have this natural cognitive support.6 We are aware that the term “religion” and 
“religious beliefs” are the subject of debate and are not unequivocal. When we use 
these terms we mean an individual belief that there is another kind of reality, or at 
least another kind of phenomena which are evoked by these religious concepts. We 
do not identify these terms with theism. We refer to the beliefs which are possessed 
by an individual. 
In this paper, the term “naturalness” in the light of CSR signifies that religious 
beliefs are a cognitively effortless and intuitive phenomenon. Religious beliefs are 
more effortless than atheism, which “requires some hard cognitive work.”7 Religious 
beliefs are produced by natural cognitive intuitions (HADD, for instance), and are 
cognitively effortless. Cognitive easiness is a consequence of the assumption that 
religious beliefs are produced by intuitive biases. In this paper we do not accept this 
point of view. Atheism is less intuitive than religious culture, but it seems a natural 
starting point in a pre-religious environment. Alleged theistic inclinations which are 
associated with natural cognition cannot be a result of cognition, but instead are a re-
sult of its cultural environment. These cultural inputs result in religious interpretations 
of the world becoming easier and more natural than atheistic explanations. However, 
this attractiveness of religion and religious beliefs seems associated with their psy-
chological and existential usefulness rather than with the activity of natural cognitive 
mechanisms, which can support both religious and atheistic concepts.
We reject the above definition of the naturalness of religion as an intuitive and 
cognitively effortless phenomenon. We also refer to the third meaning of naturalness: 
something evolved by natural selection. CSR usually rejects this sense of natural-
ness in regard to religious beliefs, and interprets religion as an evolutionary by-prod-
uct. We wish to say that naturalness understood as intuitiveness in general – and not 
only in religious matters – requires this third kind of evolutionary naturalness. We 
assume that evolutionary continuity over a long time makes a phenomenon more 
intuitive than other phenomena which are not supported by evolution. We mean in-
tuitiveness as a result of an adaptation when some trait is evolved by natural selection 
for the purpose of some function. 
Atheism seems natural at the level of biological selection. It may also be natural 
at the level of cultural group and individual selection, where there are no religious 
inputs. Religion and religious beliefs work on the level of cultural group selection, 
3 J.E. Benson, The “New Cognitive Science of Religion” and Religious Pluralism, “Dialog: A Jour-
nal of Theology” 2007, vol. 46, no. 4, p. 382; S. Atran, In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape 
of Religion, New York–Oxford, p. 173.
4 E.T. Lawson, Towards a Cognitive Science of Religion, “Numen” 2000, vol. 47, no. 3 (Religions in 
the Disenchanted World), p. 344.
5 A. Visala, op.cit., p. 55.
6 A. Norenzayan, W.M. Gervais, The Origins of Religious Disbelief, “Trends in Cognitive Sciences” 
2013, vol. 17, no. 1, p. 20.
7 Ibidem.
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and may often be understood as an adaptation, but in the sense of cultural, not natural, 
selection. Religion and religious beliefs can give an advantage for one religious indi-
vidual over a non-religious individual in the natural selection sense too. In this case, 
when we refer to a difference between proximate and ultimate explanation, religious 
beliefs are natural in the proximate but not in the ultimate sense. In the Holocene era, 
benefits appropriate for an acceptance of religious beliefs connect cultural group se-
lection with natural evolution when a religious group works better than a secular one.
In secular societies, religion lost its selective and adaptive advantage at the level 
of group selection. We can echo Ara Norenzayan’s comment that “Big Gods were 
replaced by Big Governments.”8 Religious beliefs work on the level of individual se-
lection. Religion and religious beliefs are psychologically important for the believer 
in secular societies too, and their psychological usefulness is more important than the 
desire for religious experience and moral support. Is this psychological advantage of 
religion and religious beliefs a kind of cultural or a kind of biological evolution? It 
may be interpreted in this case as an adaptation evolved by natural individual selec-
tion. This correlation is accidental and contingent and does not work at the level of 
natural group selection. Consequently, religion and religious beliefs may be an adap-
tation at the level of cultural group selection and natural individual selection, but not 
at the level of natural group selection. Naturalness of religion and religious beliefs 
at the level of the individual, in a biological sense, also requires prior cultural group 
selection. This is why the third meaning of naturalness is needed to show that religion 
and religious beliefs cannot be natural in the first and the second sense (intuitively 
and cognitively effortless), because they did not evolve by natural selection as the 
general human feature.
The prior biological intuitiveness of nonbelief in the Pleistocene era was replaced 
by religious cultural inputs in the Holocene. This conventional and contingent advan-
tage and popularity of religious beliefs and religion does not imply their intuitiveness 
in a cognitive sense. The power of religion and religious beliefs was the result of their 
psychological usefulness for individual and political as well as social and economic 
benefits for the group – benefits in the sense of parochial altruism. Religion and reli-
gious beliefs play a role for love and trust within the group, and for hate and conflicts 
with those outside the group.9 However, this correlation is not stable and does not 
support the cognitive naturalness of religion hypothesis claimed by CSR. We would 
like to show that the usefulness and popularity of religious beliefs is, the result of 
their psychological and social utility, rather than of natural theistic or religious incli-
nations of human cognition. Cognition in a secular environment supports a develop-
ment of secular, not religious ideas. Economic equality and existential security cause 
the decline of religion. The agricultural revolution caused the rise of social hierarchy 
and inequality. Religions and religious beliefs also evolved in the Holocene. It seems 
that they were correlated with inequality and social misery. It may be that the lack of 
8 Ibidem, p. 171.
9 H. Rusch, The Evolutionary Interplay of Intergroup Conflict and Altruism in Humans: a Review of 
Parochial Altruism Theory and Prospects for Its Extension, “Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 
B: Biological Sciences” 2014, vol. 281, p. 1.
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religious beliefs in the Pleistocene, an era in which small human groups were equal, 
explains the real origin of religious beliefs not connected with natural cognition.
Natural selection and information processes exclude the theory of the cognitive 
naturalness of religion.10 In the pre-religious environment in the Pleistocene, reli-
gious beliefs are not biologically important. Religious beliefs are not a result of stim-
uli received from the natural environment and, consequently, they cannot be intui-
tive and cognitively effortless. Natural selection favours features which increase the 
chances for group and individual survival.11 At the lower level of competition, natural 
selection probably favours defectors. At the higher level of competition, natural se-
lection probably favours cooperators.12 The transition from foraging to farming radi-
cally changed the natural human environment and required a new behavioural tool. 
Religion and religious beliefs were able to emerge as these tools under the selective 
pressure. But the natural history of religion and religious beliefs considered in terms 
of biological evolution seems too short a period of time to permit the interpretation 
of religion as a phenomenon which is useful in the sense of natural selection, except 
in the restricted sense of psychological usefulness to the individual mentioned above.
In particular conditions, religion and religious beliefs could have strengthened 
cooperation between unrelated individuals especially for the purposes of inter-group 
conflicts. Religious beliefs are not unique to one group, and are a necessary cultural 
tool which favours cooperation. This important question of the role of religion and 
religious beliefs for aggression and cooperation13 is not the subject matter of this 
paper, but this context shows what facets of human life are the appropriate place for 
the application of religion, and may show religion’s real origin to be not in natural 
cognition, but in the social and economical requirements of the Holocene.
The history of religious beliefs spans a very short period in human history. CSR 
focuses on recent human history in the Holocene and proclaims the cognitive natural-
ness of religion and religious beliefs on the basis of their popularity. We should sepa-
rate the geographical and historical approaches. The geographical approach supports 
the naturalness of religion hypothesis because different people in different cultures 
share similar religious beliefs and, statistically, religious beliefs dominate atheistic 
and secular ideas. The long historical approach, at least since the late Pleistocene, 
rather supports the naturalness of atheism or unbelief, showing that religious beliefs 
emerged in the recent period of the history of humanity. CSR usually takes this geo-
graphical approach and proximate perspective. Consequently, atheism is understood 
as an unnatural phenomenon which requires special effort because it is incompatible 
with natural intuitions and their accompanying religious beliefs. Atheism is only the 
10 G. Załucki, W. Zawadzki, Układ nerwowy i narządy zmysłów [Nervous System and Sensory Or-
gans] [in:] Fizjologia zwierząt [Animal Physiology], T. Krzymowski, J. Przała (eds.), Warszawa 2005, 
p. 18.
11 J. Diamond, Trzeci szympans [The Third Chimpanzee], transl. J. Weiner, Warszawa 1998.
12 M.A. Nowak, Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation, “Science” 2006, December, vol. 314, 
p. 1561.
13 See: A. Norenzayan, Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict, Princeton 
2013.
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secondary approach, which must overcome natural intuitions14. Atheism is bound to 
be charmed away.15
Armin W. Geertz and Gudmundur Ingi Markússon show that atheism may in 
some conditions be more natural than religion and religious beliefs. Religious be-
liefs are a counterintuitive phenomenon which is sometimes rejected by an individual 
who uses only intuitive knowledge.16 Benson Saler and Charles A. Ziegler suggest 
that atheism is sometimes natural and religion and religious beliefs are a cultural 
phenomenon.17 Norenzayan, Will M. Gervais and Scott Atran suggest an equivalent 
cognitive and cultural basis for theism and atheism.18 Norenzayan and Gervais sug-
gest that humans have “intuitive mental representation of supernatural factors”, and 
that atheism is contrary to the intuitive ability to accept the concepts of supernatural 
beings.19 We do not share their conclusion, because religious beliefs are a more intui-
tive phenomenon only under the presence of cultural inputs. The correlation between 
HADD (agency detection), religious beliefs, and the concepts of supernatural beings 
is relevant only among religious people, but it is not a stable correlation. It is not 
present among unbelievers.20 Atheism is more intuitive and cognitively natural in the 
non-religious environment.21
In the Pleistocene, the natural environment is a pre-religious world. Despite the 
same cognitive abilities, human ancestors did not create spontaneously religious be-
liefs, which instead probably emerged by the pressure of social changes. The origin 
of religion and religious beliefs was probably associated more with their practical 
implications (in-group trust and love, inter-group hate, conflicts and aggression) than 
with spontaneous cognitive activity. We suggest that this pragmatic context for the 
application of religion and religious beliefs is an argument for their compatibility 
with the purposes of natural selection (the third meaning of naturalness). However, 
we cannot claim that religion and religious beliefs evolved by natural selection, be-
cause it was not always needed for all and did not always guarantee survival. We 
accept only the level of natural individual selection according to which religion 
and religious beliefs can contingently be an adaptation for an individual through its 
14 J.L. Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? Cognitive Science of Religion Series, Walnut 
Creek, Calif. and Oxford 2004; A. Norenzayan, W.M. Gervais, op.cit., p. 20; A.W. Geertz, G.I. Markús-
son, Religion Is Natural, Atheism Is not: On why Everybody Is Both Right and Wrong, “Religion” 2010, 
vol. 40, p. 157; B. Saler, C.A. Ziegler, Atheism and the Apotheosis of Agency, “Temenos” 2006, vol. 42, 
no. 2, pp. 16–22.
15 C.L. Caldwell-Harris, Understanding Atheism/Non-belief as an expected Individual-Differences 
Variable, “Religion, Brain and Behavior” 2012, vol. 2 (1); J. Morgan, Untangling false Assumptions 
regarding Atheism and Health, “Zygon” 2013, vol. 48, no. 1.
16 A.W. Geertz, G.I. Markússon, op.cit.
17 B. Saler, C.A. Ziegler, op.cit.
18 A. Norenzayan, W.M. Gervais, op.cit., p. 20; S. Atran, op.cit., p. 57.
19 Ibidem, pp. 20, 23.
20 M. van Elk et al., Priming of supernatural agent concepts and agency detection, “Religion, Brain 
& Behavior” 2014, pp. 25–26.
21 W.M. Gervais, A.K. Willard, A. Norenzayan, J. Henrich, The Cultural Transmission of Faith. Why 
innate intuitions are necessary, but insufficient, to explain religious belief, “Religion” 2011, September, 
vol. 41, no. 3, p. 404; J. Morgan, op.cit., p. 18; S. Atran, op.cit., p. 11.
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psychological usefulness. This third meaning of naturalness shows that religion and 
religious beliefs are not natural in a cognitive sense because they did not evolve by 
natural group selection.
Natural cognition and cultural environment
CSR usually analyses religious beliefs which exist in a particular cultural environ-
ment.22 It tries to take into account the impact of cultural inputs on cognitive mecha-
nisms.23 The cognitive naturalness of religion and religious beliefs understood as the 
cognitively effortless nature of religious beliefs was developed by a long cultural 
history of religious systems. This is why “mind-blind atheism” refers not only to so-
phisticated concepts of God,24 but also to any religious beliefs in every pre-religious 
environment. The human mind is blind to theism in pre-religious conditions. The 
“mind-blind atheism” hypothesis describes cognitive capacities under a religious cul-
ture and does not say anything about pre-religious, natural conditions of human cog-
nition. “Mind-blind atheism” states that a person does not have theistic and religious 
intuitions, positing that nobody has them. Instead, we should say that theistic and re-
ligious inclinations are shaped by the religious environment and do not have a theistic 
nature because they need cultural inputs which decide cognitive preferences. This is 
why Norenzayan and Gervais are probably wrong when they write that “some people 
become atheists also because they turn against the intuitive biases that make some 
supernatural concepts intuitive.”25 The atheist does not turn against his intuitions. He 
has the same intuitive biases which are commonly shared by atheists and theists, such 
as intuitive physics, biology, psychology, and ontology. The atheist does not interpret 
the world in a religious, theistic, manner, and does not give his intuitions religious 
content. The difference lies in the way of interpreting the natural and human world 
which is determined by cultural, educational, and social inputs. Cultural learning is 
the most important factor, because lack of religion can exclude acquisition and de-
velopment of religion.26 Learning also plays a crucial role in many other fields which 
refer to human behavioural patterns and morality.27
“Apatheism” is associated with high and secure standards of life and is devel-
oped in the richest and the most secure countries.28 However, the standard of life 
22 A. Norenzayan, W.M. Gervais, op.cit., pp. 20–21.
23 W.M. Gervais, A.K. Willard, A. Norenzayan, J. Henrich, op.cit., pp. 390, 405; B. Saler, C.A. Ziegler, 
Atheism and the Apotheosis of Agency, “Temenos” 2006, vol. 42, no. 2, p. 35; A.W. Geertz, Too much Mind 
and not enough Brain, Body and Culture: On what needs to be done in the Cognitive Science of Religion, 
“Historia Religionum” 2010, no. 2, p. 37; A.W. Geertz, Religious Narrative, Cognition and Culture: Ap-
proaches and Deﬁnitions [in:] A.W. Geertz, J. Sinding (eds.), Religious Narrative, Cognition and Culture: 
Image and Word in the Mind of Narrative, Shefﬁeld Oakvill 2011.
24 A. Norenzayan, W.M. Gervais, op.cit., p. 21.
25 Ibidem, p. 23.
26 Ibidem.
27 F. Cushman, The role of learning in punishment, prosociality, and human uniqueness [in:] 
K. Sterelny, R. Joyce, B. Calcott, B. Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution, Cambridge, MA 2013.
28 A. Norenzayan, W.M. Gervais, op.cit., pp. 21–22.
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was probably higher before the Agricultural Revolution, and was associated with 
the above-mentioned equal and stable nature of small social groups. The standard of 
life rose again in recent decades only in a small part of the world and was associated 
with the rise of atheism. This negative correlation is an argument for the cognitive 
naturalness of atheism, which is the natural point of view under a good standard 
of life. Here we refer to natural selection. Religion and religious beliefs cannot be 
understood as evolved by natural group selection, because they were not used to 
improve the standard of life and the probability of survival. However, they could be 
motivated by some natural tendencies to survival when humanity looked for cultural 
tools which enabled cooperation between unrelated individuals for the purpose of 
intergroup conflicts. A low standard of life is often correlated with an increasing level 
of religiosity. In this particular sense religion and religious beliefs can be understood 
as a natural approach.
We should go beyond the proximate explanation of origin and transmission of 
religious beliefs, which refers only to cognitive mechanisms. Rather, we should look 
for the ultimate factors associated with the natural and cultural adaptive function of 
religion and religious beliefs.29 However, we have excluded a direct correlation be-
tween natural selective pressure and religious beliefs and underlined the cultural and 
social usefulness of religious beliefs. Of course, in some sense this cultural and social 
application of religion and religious beliefs is mediated by primary natural biological 
human interests. Inter-group conflicts are a feature of natural selection because they 
are used to win territories, food and mates. Religion and religious beliefs may foster 
conflicts. In this sense, religious beliefs are a cultural tool which is beneficial for 
natural group and individual selection. Theoretically, religious idols can strengthen 
the power of moral rules more than the authority of living persons. They can play the 
role of a managing leader of the group.30 Finally, as Norenzayan claims, “watched 
people are nice people.”31
We can find a similar explanatory difficulty in moral and ethical matters when 
looking for selfish or altruistic human nature in terms of biological evolution.32 In 
some sense, the alleged naturalness of religious beliefs or unbelief leaves an explana-
tory gap. They are two sides of the same biological human orientation to look for 
tools which increase the biological chances for survival. Just as aggression is some-
times more useful than altruism, theism or religiosity is sometimes more useful than 
atheism. However, this latter dichotomy is more associated with education and for-
mation of ideology than with the dichotomy between aggression and altruism which 
work in the natural animal world. The altruistic or selfish approach could develop 
spontaneously in the framework of natural ecological pressure. Religious beliefs re-
quire cultural inputs, and the connection of religious beliefs with existential pros and 
cons is less important and stable, and more superficial, random and contingent than 
29 B.Crespi, B. Summers, Inclusive fitness theory for the evolution of religion, “Animal Behaviour” 
2014, no. XXX, p. 2.
30 Ibidem, pp. 5–6.
31 A. Norenzayan, op.cit., p. 19.
32 K. Szocik, Roots of self-domestication, “Science” 2014, November, vol. 346, issue 6213, p. 1067.
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altruistic and selfish behavioural patterns. This is why we can speak about the natu-
ralness of religion only with rigorous reference to cultural inputs.
Naturalistic cognitive anthropology explains religion and religious beliefs by 
looking for the material causes of mental representations.33 The cognitive processes 
and mechanisms used by religious beliefs are common to all kinds of beliefs.34 There-
fore we speak in terms of the universality of basic religious beliefs rooted in the uni-
versality of the cognitive system. Of course, basic beliefs are modified in particular 
cultures.35 Religious beliefs, like other kinds of beliefs, can be explained causally.36 
However, Aku Visala suggests going beyond this narrow naturalistic and reductive 
approach to a wider explanatory perspective.37 This cognitive and neuronal back-
ground of religious beliefs implies the fourth meaning of the naturalness of religion 
– the non-supernatural. This meaning is obvious, and we do not refer to it. We fo-
cus only on the above-mentioned intuitiveness (the first meaning of naturalness), the 
cognitively effortless nature of religion and religious beliefs (the second meaning), 
and an assumption of something evolved by natural selection (the third meaning). 
However, this fourth meaning of naturalness does not imply the first two meanings 
of naturalness of religion and religious beliefs. Science is also non-supernatural, but 
it is not intuitive and cognitively effortless.38
Pre-religious human ancestors 
Religious beliefs are commonly shared in the world, despite their lack of reference to 
real events and phenomena.39 The HADD (Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device) 
hypothesis suggests that human beings have a tendency to look for, to see, and to 
interpret reality in terms of an agent and an agency.40 HADD, together with “Theory 
of Mind” (ToM), is the natural cognitive background for the production and transmis-
sion of religious beliefs.41 HADD theoretically generates supernatural representations 
33 S. Atran, op.cit., p. 10
34 J. Sørensen, Religion in Mind: A Review Article of the Cognitive Science of Religion, “Numen” 
2005, vol. 52, no. 4, p. 469.
35 J.L. Barrett, Cognitive Science of Religion: Looking Back, Looking Forward, “Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion” 2011, 50 (2), p. 231.
36 A. Visala, Ashgate Science and Religion..., p. 22.
37 A.Visala, Explaining Religion at Different Levels: from Fundamentalism to Pluralism [in:] The 
Roots of Religion. Exploring the Cognitive Science of Religion, R. Trigg, J.L. Barrett (eds.), Farnham 
2014, pp. 56, 65.
38 R.N. McCauley, Why Religion is Natural and Science Is Not, Oxford 2011.
39 S. Fondevila, M. Martin-Loeches, Cognitive Mechanisms for the Evolution of Religious Thought, 
“Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences” 2013, 1299, p. 84.
40 J.L. Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? Cognitive Science of Religion Series, Walnut 
Creek, Calif. and Oxford 2004. 
41 P. Boyer, Religion Explained. The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought, New York 2001, 
p. 71; D. Leech, A. Visala, Naturalistic Explanation for Religious Belief [and Comments and Reply], 
“Philosophy Compass” 2011, vol. 6 (8), pp. 554–555.
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of natural causes.42 ToM equips religious figures in improved human properties con-
nected to a more complete access to strategically important information.43
Boyer explains the origin of HADD by an evolutionary reference to predator and 
prey. Care about life and the biological continuation of the organism is a stable bio-
logical feature.44 However, Boyer’s point of view overestimates human rational abili-
ties. How did human ancestors in the Pleistocene create religious beliefs? Like all 
animal species, humans are ruled by biological needs. In the pre-religious period the 
lives of our human ancestors were more similar to the lives of other primates than 
to those of the Homo sapiens sapiens living today. It seems impossible that human 
ancestors in the Pleistocene could naturally, in an intuitive and cognitively effortless 
way, create religious beliefs by HADD and other cognitive abilities. Religious beliefs 
are not natural and evident. This tendency to create them is contrary to the biological 
nature of humans, which is determined more by emotions, instincts and biological 
intuitions than by evolutionarily costly rational processes.45 Religious beliefs are not 
natural and intuitive merely in virtue of this biological background. This religious 
ability does not seem to be adaptive and useful. Religious beliefs may be useful for 
large groups to include and consolidate unrelated individuals. With reference to kin 
selection and direct reciprocity – which has worked throughout almost all human his-
tory – every natural device for the creation of religious beliefs is useless. Mutual trust 
is based on kinship and “tit-for-tat” sociality, not on strange and unnatural beliefs.
The MCI hypothesis (Minimal Counterintuitiveness) tries to explain the impact 
of religious beliefs on the human mind.46 Objects and phenomena incompatible with 
intuitions provoke more human attention than intuitive phenomena.47 A person uses 
intuitive physics, biology, and psychology.48 Religious beliefs flout intuitive onto-
logical categories.49 However, there are plenty of intuitive beliefs and concepts which 
are more successful than counterintuitive religious beliefs – such as truth, goodness, 
justice, causality, or purposefulness, which are intuitively commonly shared. In 
contrast, religious beliefs could not have survived without institutional support and 
cultural transmission. In this context, their compatibility with intuitiveness does not 
matter.50 The dogmas of the Holy Trinity or the divine nature of Jesus could not have 
survived without long and hard institutional support, despite their counterintuitive-
42 B. Saler, C.A. Ziegler, op.cit., pp. 18–19.
43 P. Boyer, Religion Explained. The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought, New York 2001, 
p. 156; S. Atran, op.cit., p. 59.
44 P. Boyer, Religion Explained. The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought, p. 145.
45 J. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judg-
ment, “Psychological Review” 2001, vol. 108, no. 4.
46 P. Boyer, The Naturalness of Religious Ideas: A Cognitive Theory of Religion. Berkeley–London 
1994; S. Atran, op.cit., pp. 96–97, 106–107; J.L. Barrett, Cognitive Science of Religion: What is it and 
why is it?, “Religion Compass” 2007, vol. 1/6, p. 771.
47 S. Fondevila, M. Martin-Loeches, op.cit., pp. 85–86.
48 L. Näreaho, The Cognitive Science of Religion: Philosophical Observations, “Religious Studies” 
2008, March, vol. 44, no. 1, p. 84.
49 D. Leech, A. Visala, Naturalistic Explanation for Religious Belief [and Comments and Reply], 
“Philosophy Compass” 2011, vol. 6 (8), p. 554.
50 W.M. Gervais, A.K. Willard, A. Norenzayan, J. Henrich, op.cit., p. 396.
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ness. Also children require educational training, which in religious families prepares 
them for religious initiations.
How do non-human animals react to counterintuitive phenomena? Are there use-
ful traits in terms of natural selection? What cognitive strategy could be better for 
survival: either remembering better intuitively (part of the natural world) or disre-
garding counterintuitively things and phenomena (they really do not exist)? We can 
assume that humans are an exceptional animal because of their large brain size and 
their ability to produce religion, philosophy or literature. However, we should not 
overestimate the significance of religion. Mental cognition and imagination are natu-
ral human abilities. Their religious, philosophical or literary contents are a secondary 
cultural matter and do not say anything about the naturalness of religion, philosophy 
or literature. 
According to Boyer, a minimal counterintuitiveness of religious beliefs is a suf-
ficient condition for their propagation.51 Daniel Dennett suggests that religious beliefs 
need a high level of counterintuitiveness and paradoxicality, which protect them against 
critique. Paradox provides coherence for elements which may be truly copied and can-
not be paraphrased.52 Counterintuitive ideas have a mnemonic advantage over intuitive 
ones.53 Boyer claims that the most popular religious ideas have to be compatible with 
mental predispositions.54 In this sense, they are interpreted as a natural result of cogni-
tion which works with intuitive physics, biology, and psychology.55 The cognitively 
effortless ability to accept counterintuitive contents appears to be an anti-evolutionary 
feature, and would create a great fissure with the natural approach appropriate for non-
human animals and humans. A feature which is unnatural in the biological sense cannot 
be natural in a cognitive manner (consider from before: the naturalness in the first and 
the second meaning requires the third meaning of naturalness). 
Agency detection device and naturalistic approach 
If CSR is right, atheism is cognitively unnatural.56 According to Barrett, a naturalis-
tic explanation of unidentified phenomena is contrary to HADD. Atran claims that 
HADD can explain peculiar phenomena.57 Naturalism requires education, in contrast 
51 E.T. Lawson, op.cit., p. 345.
52 D.C. Dennett, Odczarowanie. Religia jako zjawisko naturalne [Breaking the Spell. Religion as 
a natural phenomenon]. transl. B. Stanosz, Warszawa 2008, pp. 271–272; A.W. Geertz, How Not to Do 
the Cognitive Science of Religion Today, “Method and Theory in the Study of Religion” 2008, vol. 20; 
G.R. Peterson, Why the New Atheism shouldn’t be (completely) dismissed, “Zygon” 2007, December, 
vol. 42, no. 4, p. 805.
53 E.T. Lawson, op.cit., p. 346.
54 P. Boyer, Religion Explained..., p. 50
55 A. Visala, Ashgate Science and Religion: Naturalism, Theism and the Cognitive Study of Religion: 
Religion Explained?, Farnham 2011, pp. 38–39
56 J. Jong, Explaining Religion (Away?). Theism and the Cognitive Science of Religion, Sophia 2013.
57 S. Atran, op.cit., p. 78
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to the easy and intuitive theistic explanation warranted by HADD.58 Consequently, 
Barrett assumes the self-evidence of theism. He interprets CSR as a discipline which 
strengthens the theistic approach. Barrett and Ian M. Church suggest that the false 
nature of theistic beliefs which are based on natural cognition would undermine the 
effectiveness and credibility of human cognition, which in this case would create 
false outputs.59 As we showed above, it seems that in the pre-religious environment 
atheism is a more adaptive approach for a biological organism which is predisposed 
to natural explanations, natural events and natural phenomena. Human beings have 
cognitive access only to natural things. This access is based on sensation and per-
ception. HADD may look for other organic motivations rather than relying upon 
religious beliefs that are brought in by the culture. HADD, understood as a natural 
cognitive device which automatically generates religious beliefs, sounds like a bio-
logical aberration. Why look for a God/gods instead of for food, mates and predators?
An atheist does not create and adapt religious beliefs, despite having the same 
cognitive mechanisms (HADD, ToM) as a believer. If someone does not accept reli-
gion, he nevertheless knows it and its social importance. Cognitive mechanisms do 
not lead to theistic interpretations in the case of anxiety. Cultural representations of 
religious figures as beings which are particularly engaged in individual human life 
may cause reference to them when human beings do not feel existentially secure. 
Not all humans share the religious interpretations of uncertain and unexplained phe-
nomena. Humans sometimes interpret the same things and events in different man-
ners. The basis for these explanatory variations is different cultural factors, which 
provide either religious or secular contents.
Conclusions 
Within CSR, religion is understood as a phenomenon which refers to various cog-
nitive mechanisms. Religion and religious beliefs are natural in the sense of non-
supernatural phenomena. Another basic meaning of their naturalness which is used 
in CSR seems more troublesome. The first and second meaning of the naturalness 
of religion assume that religion and religious beliefs are intuitive and cognitively 
effortless. Consequently, they are understood as phenomena which are more evident 
than atheism. Some parts of religion and some religious beliefs could perhaps be 
interpreted as natural in this cognitive sense. Others require strong cognitive effort 
and therefore, as evolutionarily costly, are rather unnatural. Referring to HADD is 
the correct approach under the culture in which religious inputs exist. Without the 
cultural inputs, HADD probably cannot produce religious beliefs.
58 J.L. Barrett, The relative unnaturalness of atheism: On why Geertz and Markússon are both right 
and wrong, “Religion” 2010, vol. 40, p. 170.
59 J.L. Barrett, I.M. Church, Should CSR Give Atheists Epistemic Assurance? On Beer-Goggles, 
BFFs, and Barrett & Church, Skepticism regarding Religious Beliefs, “The Monist” 2013, vol. 96, no. 3, 
pp. 321–322.
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We are trying to demonstrate the correctness of our critique of the cognitive natu-
ralness of religion hypothesis by reference to the third meaning of naturalness – which 
is evolution by natural selection. In our approach the intuitive trait becomes cogni-
tively intuitive by its biological naturalness. As we showed, religion and religious 
beliefs do not have this kind of naturalness at the level of natural group selection. 
The potential correlation between religion, religious beliefs and natural individual 
selection is not sufficient. Moral patterns such as aggression, empathy, and altruism 
became intuitive because they were natural behavioural strategies with a very long 
evolutionary history. They are deeply rooted in human biology. Analogously, reli-
gious beliefs could become intuitive when they were biologically natural. However, 
we know that religious beliefs did not meet with intensive selective pressure. From 
elsewhere we know that religion and religious beliefs are not natural in the biological 
sense, and consequently they cannot be natural in the cognitive sense. Natural cogni-
tive processes are blind and can be fulfilled by religious or secular contents.
Perhaps, however, we should not make a distinction between human predisposi-
tions and patterns along atheistic and theistic or religious lines. It seems better to 
interpret these two approaches as two sides of one human life-strategy, which some-
times requires religious beliefs and sometimes secular and atheistic ideas.
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